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ON SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Steven G. Calabresi* & Nicholas P. Stabile** 
It is an honor to publish with such a distinguished panel at the 
American Constitution Society’s annual conference on the subject of 
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments.  We 
agree with the panelists before us who have described the adoption of 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as being a 
Second Founding of the Republic.  The Reconstruction Amendments 
fundamentally transformed our constitutional structure.  One cannot 
begin to understand or appreciate American constitutional law with-
out a theory of what happened during Reconstruction. 
We have not previously written about Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,1 so we will offer here only some preliminary thoughts 
on that subject which we are open to revising if others show us to be 
wrong.  Our thoughts on this are still tentative, especially because we 
find ourselves in disagreement with both a number of key Supreme 
Court decisions in this area and with some scholars who have studied 
the question for longer and in more detail than we have.  With those 
caveats, we would like to make six points about Section 5 inspired by 
our reflections on the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, where the Court struck down Congress’s effort to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment by passing the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (“RFRA”).2  That Act,3 of course, sought to displace the Su-
preme Court’s decision on the scope of the Free Exercise Clause as it 
applied to the States in Employment Division v. Smith.4  Our thoughts 
on this grow out of Judge Michael McConnell’s provocative essay cri-
 
 * George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University.  Professor Cala-
bresi’s ideas on this topic have benefitted over the years from many conversations with 
John Harrison, Gary Lawson, and Tom Merrill—none of whom are to blame for what we 
say here. 
 ** J.D. candidate 2009, Northwestern University. 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 2 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2000). 
 4 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that states may prohibit sacramental peyote use). 
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tiquing Boerne in the Harvard Law Review.5  We will address briefly 
Boerne’s progeny. 
I. 
The first point we want to make about the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act and Boerne is that we agree with McConnell that the Su-
preme Court’s opinion is overly judge-centric and is wrong in so far 
as it seems to suggest that Congress cannot interpret and enforce the 
Constitution equally with the Court.6  Our Constitution is unique 
among modern constitutions in that it does not empower a particular 
entity to interpret and enforce it.  In this respect, the U.S. Constitu-
tion differs from, for example, the German Constitution, because it 
does not contain a judicial review clause assigning the power to en-
force it to a Constitutional Court.7  The power of judicial review is in-
stead deduced, as every first year law student learns in Marbury v. 
Madison,8 by a structural inference from the fact that the Supreme 
Court has the power to decide cases or controversies, that it has the 
obligation to decide them faithfully to the law, and that the Constitu-
tion is higher law than is a statute.  From all these facts, Chief Justice 
Marshall quite rightly concluded that when the Court is deciding a 
case or controversy, it has the power and the duty to interpret the 
Constitution.9 
Marshall’s argument defends judicial review, but it does so on 
grounds that make it clear that the political branches of government 
also have the power and duty to enforce the Constitution.10  After all, 
Congress has the legislative power, just as the Court has the power to 
decide cases or controversies.  When Congress is legislating, we think 
it clear that it has the power and duty to interpret the Constitution.  
Early in American history, Congress often debated and decided con-
stitutional issues, as David Currie has shown in a splendid series of 
 
 5 See Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:  A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). 
 6 See id. at 155–57. 
 7 “The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule . . . on the interpretation of this Basic Law in 
the event of disputes concerning the extent of the rights and duties of a supreme federal 
body or of other parties vested with rights of their own by this Basic Law or by the rules of 
procedure of a supreme federal body.”  GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [CONSTITUTION] art. 93, § 1 
(F.R.G.). 
 8 5 (1 Cranch) U.S. 137 (1803). 
 9 Id. at 177. 
 10 Id. at 173–80. 
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books.11  Congress played the same role during Reconstruction,12 the 
New Deal,13 and the Great Society14 as well.  Nothing in the text of the 
Constitution suggests that its interpretation is more the business of 
the Supreme Court than it is of Congress.  And, while our practice 
has been to let the Court take the lead in this area, we have also long 
recognized that Congress and the President have a legitimate role to 
play as well.15  Text and practice suggest that Congress, like the Court, 
has both the power and the duty to interpret and to enforce the Con-
stitution.  Any implication to the contrary in City of Boerne v. Flores and 
its progeny is just plain wrong. 
Judge McConnell is thus right when he says that the opinion in 
that case falsely posited a dichotomy between Congress having the 
power to change the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution, 
as opposed to Congress having only a power to create remedies to en-
force Section 1.16  There is an intermediate option that the Boerne 
Court does not discuss:  Congress has the power to interpret Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it is legislating to enforce it 
under Section 5.  Congress’s power to interpret Section 1 is not a 
power to rewrite it to mean anything it wants.  But neither is it only a 
power to provide remedies for violations that the Court has already 
identified.  Section 5 allows Congress to enforce Section 1 rights be-
fore the Supreme Court has identified them, so long as at the end of 
the day, the Court agrees that the rights in question are encompassed 
in the meaning of Section 1. 
We thus agree in part with Michael Kent Curtis when he says that 
in the American tradition, the legislature is to some degree a guard-
ian of our liberties.17  We think this is true, especially with respect to 
 
 11 See, e.g., DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–
1801 (1999) (concluding that the original understanding of the Constitution was forged 
not so much in the courts as in the legislative and executive branches). 
 12 See Michael Kent Curtis, Congressional Enforcement of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendment & the State Action Syllogism:  An Historical Overview, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381 
(2009). 
 13 See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:  A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN 
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941). 
 14 See, e.g., S. REP. NO 88-872 (1964) (debating the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964); H.R. REP. NO 88-914 (1963) (debating the same); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252–78 (1964) (holding that Congress had the power 
under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even if the Court in 
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), held the Civil Rights Act of 1875 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 15 See WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION?  THE DEBATE OVER INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY 
(The Federalist Society ed. 1992). 
 16 See McConnell, supra note 5, at 163–65. 
 17 Curtis, supra note 12. 
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Congress.  More than twenty-five years ago, Professor Calabresi wrote 
his student note on how James Madison’s Federalist Ten had turned 
out to be right in that the Congress of our extended federal republic 
has had a much better track record on civil liberties than have the 
state legislatures.18  That assertion is still true today.  A legislature in 
an extended republic is inherently more likely to protect minority 
factions and civil rights than are state legislatures.  For that reason, 
the Supreme Court ought to review the work product of Congress 
with more deference than it accords to the work product of state leg-
islatures. 
II. 
This leads to our second point about Boerne and RFRA, regarding 
the degree of deference the Supreme Court ought to give to Con-
gress in Section 5 cases.  Judge McConnell argues for quite a bit of 
deference.19  He analogizes the Section 5 context to Chevron and says 
we ought to give as much deference here as we do there.20  At times, 
Judge McConnell comes close to saying that the Supreme Court 
ought to use a Thayerian rule of clear mistake21 in Section 5 cases:  
only striking down Acts of Congress that are plainly, palpably, and in 
every respect unconstitutional as violations of Section 5.  Judge 
McConnell thinks it is important to defend a congressional power to 
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as being different from a pow-
er substantively to alter the Constitution, because he justifiably be-
lieves there are a lot of hard questions in constitutional law as to 
which reasonable people could come down in different ways.  He 
thinks that as to those questions the Supreme Court ought to defer, 
Chevron-style, to any reasonable interpretation Congress might choose 
to enact.22 
We disagree with Judge McConnell that the standard for Supreme 
Court invalidation of Section 5 legislation is a kind of “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” standard.23  There is no textual warrant for that stan-
 
 18 Steven G. Calabresi, Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 
YALE L. J. 1403 (1982). 
 19 See e.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 173, 184–89. 
 20 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (articulat-
ing a doctrine granting deference to administrative agencies in interpreting their own 
statutory mandates). 
 21 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. 
L. REV. 129 (1893). 
 22 See McConnell, supra note 5, at 184–89. 
 23 McConnell, supra note 5, at 185–88. 
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dard.  The text gives Congress the power “to enforce” the rights cre-
ated by Section 1 by adopting “appropriate” legislation.  It does not 
say that the Supreme Court must defer to Congress’s interpretations 
of Section 1 when deciding cases or controversies unless it thinks 
Congress is wrong beyond a reasonable doubt.  The congressional 
supremacy view of Section 5 is just as wrong as is the judicial suprem-
acy view taken by Justice Kennedy in Boerne.24  The Supreme Court has 
the power and the duty to decide cases and controversies agreeably to 
the Constitution.  It must make its own independent evaluation of 
whether a law “enforces” or changes the meaning of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In making an independent evaluation on this question, the Court 
ought to accord congressional statutes a presumption of constitu-
tionality because our Constitution is enforced by a three branch 
process of checks and balances.  By the time a case reaches the Su-
preme Court, two of the three branches charged with enforcing the 
Constitution, indeed sworn by oath to do so, will have made a deci-
sion that the action in question is permissible.  The Court thus ought 
to presume that congressional enactments are constitutional unless a 
preponderance of the evidence suggests they are not. 
As a practical matter, there are two distinct ways in which Section 
5 legislation could be said to be unconstitutional under the text of 
Section 5, and the Court ought to follow different paths in those two 
different textual contexts.  First, Section 5 legislation could be chal-
lenged on the ground that it does not really “enforce” Section 1 but 
rather redefines it, either by eliminating rights that Section 1 in fact 
protects or by adding new rights that go beyond what Section 1 pro-
vides.  This question of whether a congressional enactment “en-
forces” rights actually in Section 1 or whether it “changes” them is 
one the Court is perfectly positioned to decide using a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.  The Supreme Court has—for good or 
for ill—been the preeminent interpreter of Section 1 for the last 140 
years, and it has both the right and the duty to form its own inde-
pendent views on whether a law enforces Section 1 or goes beyond it.  
Judge McConnell makes a provocative argument as to why the Court 
ought to defer here to Congress, but we think his view is contrary to 
140 years of practice. 
There is, however, a second question that may arise in Section 5 
cases:  is a particular law “appropriate” as a remedy for a Section 1 vi-
olation?  The question of appropriateness is one of degree, and here 
 
 24 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525–29 (1997). 
1436 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:5 
 
more deference to Congress with its greater fact-finding resources 
both makes a lot of sense and seems contemplated by the text.  Rea-
sonable people can disagree on what remedies are “appropriate” to 
address particular rights violations.  Holding hearings and gathering 
evidence are indispensible here, and it is also reasonable to conclude 
that the constitutional text delegates the question of degrees of “ap-
propriateness” to Congress to decide.  On the appropriateness ques-
tion, we would apply something like Chevron deference.  So long as 
the law really “enforces” Section 1, rather than changing it, Congress 
ought to have wide latitude in choosing among enforcement reme-
dies. 
Advocates of congressional power under Section 5 point out that 
those who ratified it analogized congressional power in this context 
to congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.25  
The questions of what is “appropriate” and what is “proper” or “nec-
essary” in the sense of “convenient to” or “useful to” seem to be the 
same.26  Thus, it is often claimed that Congress ought to get as much 
deference when legislating under Section 5 as it gets when legislating 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause as construed in McCulloch v. 
Maryland.  Several proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Congress clearly said as much.  Unless Congress is using a pretext to 
justify Section 5 legislation, as pretext is discussed in McCulloch, Con-
gress ought to have its way in the Supreme Court. 
There is a difference, however, between Congress’s power under 
Section 5 and its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
discussed in McCulloch v. Maryland.  Section 5 legislation must not on-
ly be “appropriate”; it must also be legislation “to enforce” Section 1.  
The Necessary and Proper Clause contains a similar but never dis-
cussed constraint giving Congress the power to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper “for carrying into execution” the fore-
going enumerated powers.  Marshall did not construe this language 
in McCulloch.  Instead, the case turned primarily on the meaning of 
the word “necessary”, and secondarily on the deference Congress 
should receive as to what was “proper.”27  But McCulloch never ad-
dressed the meaning of the verb “to enforce” because those words 
 
 25 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 5; Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Four-
teenth Amendment:  City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 
YALE L. J. 115 (1999). 
 26 “The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and prop-
er for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 27 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 (1 Cranch) U.S. 316, 411–15 (1819). 
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were not present in the Necessary and Proper Clause just as it did not 
address the requirement that laws enacted under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause “carry into execution” the enumerated powers.  Per-
haps the Court overlooked this language. 
In any event, McCulloch was not followed.  Andrew Jackson re-
jected it and successfully killed the Bank of the United States28 until 
Woodrow Wilson became president.  His successors took a similarly 
narrow view on issues like congressional power to make internal im-
provements and therefore on the scope of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.29  Thus, even if the Section 5 power is as broad as congres-
sional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is not clear 
that there was widespread agreement in the years between McCulloch 
and 1868 that Marshall’s reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
was correct.30  There was certainly no agreement on whether Marshall 
had been right about the meaning of words like to “carry into execu-
tion” or to “enforce” since Marshall never even addressed this issue. 
As the Boerne Court realized, the verb “to enforce” is at the very 
heart of the Section 5 power,31 and it is for that reason we think that 
Court got the Section 5 issue essentially right.  (Though, as we shall 
presently explain, we disagree with the Court as to the Free Exercise 
Clause.)  What was the original public meaning of “to enforce” in 
1868?  Consider the following definitions offered in Noah Webster’s 
1828 authoritative edition of the English language:  “1.  To give 
strength to; to strengthen; to invigorate. . . . 6.  To compel; to con-
strain; to force; 7.  To put in execution; to cause to take effect; as to 
enforce the laws.”32  It is clear from these that the power “to enforce” 
Section 1 is not a power “to rewrite it.”  This sense is confirmed in The 
Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology where enforce is said to come from the 
Latin roots “in” meaning “make” and “fortis” meaning strong.33  To 
enforce something is thus literally to make it stronger, not to change 
its meaning! 
 
 28 Veto Message of July 10, 1832, 3 COMP. MESSAGES & PAPERS PRES. 1139 (1897). 
 29 See, e.g., PAUL H. BERGERON, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES K. POLK 193–200 (1987) (noting 
President Polk’s opposition to internal improvement bills); J. Richard Broughton, Re-
thinking the Presidential Veto, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 112 n.135, 123–24 (2005) (noting 
President Tyler’s veto of internal improvement bills). 
 30 See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 292–97 (HarperCollins Publish-
ers, Inc. 1997) (1997) (explaining congressional impact on American expansion in the 
mid-nineteenth century). 
 31 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516–20 (1997). 
 32 Noah Webster, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828). 
 33 BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY (Robert Barhnart ed. 1988). 
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It is for this reason that we agree with Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, in so far as it criticizes Justice Brennan’s major-
ity opinion in that case and the ratchet theory of footnote ten.34  You 
do not enforce or make stronger Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by changing its meaning.  The correctness of City of 
Boerne v. Flores thus depends on whether RFRA was a law that en-
forced the Free Exercise Clause as incorporated by Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because Employment Division v. Smith was 
wrongly decided. 
But, it might be objected that the weight we give to original public 
meaning of the verb “to enforce” is not supported by the legislative 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment referred to above, which ap-
provingly cites Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch; however, that opinion 
never discusses the words “to enforce,” and in any event, we agree 
with Justice Scalia in believing that it is the original public meaning of 
the text which ought to count in constitutional interpretation.  It is 
the text which was presented to the States and through them, the 
people for ratification, and it is the words of the text that are su-
preme law.  The people who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 
never had a chance to debate or amend or vote up and down on the 
legislative history and probably did not know what it said.  Thus, it is 
the original public meaning of the text of Section 5 which controls 
and not the legislative history. 
III. 
The third main point we want to make in this essay is that Con-
gress does have the power to enforce the individual rights protected 
in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as Michael Kent Curtis 
argues on this panel.35  Simply put, we think the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause does protect the individual rights in the Bill of Rights 
from state abridgment, as well as those unenumerated individual 
rights described as being privileges or immunities by Justice Bushrod 
Washington in Corfield v. Coryell.36  Such unenumerated rights are, as 
Professor Calabresi argued in the Michigan Law Review and the Ohio 
State Law Journal, rights that are deeply rooted in American history 
and tradition and that can be overcome by the police power when the 
 
 34 384 U.S. 641, 660–61, 665–71 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 35 Curtis, supra note 12. 
 36 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
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State enacts general laws for the good of the whole people.37  As we 
just indicated, we think individual rights are protected by the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause rather than by substantive due process as 
the Supreme Court has held, but either way Congress plainly has 
power “to enforce” individual rights by enacting “appropriate” legisla-
tion under Section 5.  We do not see how this question could be an-
swered in any other way.  There is no principled way in which the Su-
preme Court could say that something is a right for Section 1 
purposes, but Congress lacks power to enforce it under Section 5.  
Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce Section 1.  Section 1, 
either through the Privileges or Immunities Clause or through sub-
stantive due process, creates individual rights.  It follows a fortiori that 
Congress has the power to enforce or make stronger the rights pro-
tected by Section 1. 
This, at long last, raises the question of whether Section 1 protects 
the free exercise of religion, not only from laws that on their face dis-
criminate on the basis of religion, but also from laws that disparately 
burden religious groups even though those laws are neutral on their 
face.  The historic preservation law at issue in Boerne, which was pre-
venting the church there from building an addition, did not on its 
face discriminate on the basis of religion, but it certainly did burden 
the church by preventing it from expanding.  Are such facially neu-
tral burdensome laws violations of the Free Exercise Clause? 
To answer that question, one must ask what the plain language of 
the Free Exercise Clause protects.  It protects more than freedom of 
conscience or religious belief, because it protects the free exercise of 
religion.  It does not protect religion per se, which might be a forbid-
den establishment, instead and to emphasize again, it protects the 
“exercise” of religion.  What is the “exercise” of religion?  The word 
clearly and self-evidently includes some action as well as belief.  Sarah 
Agudo and Professor Calabresi note in an article forthcoming in the 
Texas Law Review that almost all of the State free exercise clauses in 
1868, thirty-five out of thirty-seven, protected “freedom of worship” 
rather than the free exercise of religion.38  This may indicate that the 
Free Exercise Clause would likely have been understood as a protec-
 
 37 Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance 
on Foreign Constitutional Law:  An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (2004); Ste-
ven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”:  In Defense of United 
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995). 
 38 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions in 1868:  
What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2008). 
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tion for freedom of religious worship in 1868, when the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause became supreme law. 
This is interesting because one can imagine a range of religious 
freedoms that the Free Exercise Clause might protect.  At its narrow-
est, the Clause would protect freedom of conscience or belief.  A 
slightly broader reading would protect freedom to profess one’s faith 
in private.  Slightly broader than that would be freedom to hold reli-
gious ceremonies of worship in private with other people.  Broader 
yet again would be a freedom to profess one’s faith publicly, to wor-
ship publicly, and to proselytize—perhaps as persistently as Jehovah’s 
Witnesses are wont to do.  Broader still would be a freedom to raise 
and to educate, or not to educate, one’s children in one’s faith.  And 
finally, perhaps the broadest understanding of free exercise is the 
one encompassed in RFRA itself, which protects all action from fa-
cially neutral government laws that disparately burden religious belief 
and that are not supported by a compelling governmental interest. 
If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Im-
munities Clause understood the free exercise of religion as encom-
passing freedom of worship, how broad is that freedom?  Is the reli-
gious freedom encompassed by RFRA a freedom of worship?  It 
seems pretty clear to us that RFRA goes somewhat beyond what we 
would ordinarily describe as the protection of “worship.”39  But that is 
not necessarily fatal to the law because three-quarters of the States in 
1868, in addition to protecting freedom of worship, also protected ei-
ther unenumerated “natural and inalienable” rights to “liberty”40 or 
recognized that the enumeration in state constitutions of certain 
rights should not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the people.  One minimal way to give force to these “baby” Ninth 
Amendments41 and “natural and inalienable” rights clauses in an Ar-
ticle V three-quarters consensus of the States is to read enumerated 
rights—like freedom of worship—broadly.  Arguably that is all that 
RFRA does.  In any event, the activity at issue in City of Boerne v. Flores 
was directly related to the freedom of worship because the church 
sought to add onto its building to accommodate a growing congrega-
tion for ceremonies of worship.42  Freedom of worship was thus abso-
lutely central to the Boerne case.  Freedom of worship was also central 
 
 39 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(2)–2000bb(a)(3) (2000). 
 40 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 38, at 66–67. 
 41 John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967 (1993) (arguing that 
the Ninth Amendment is the most dynamic and open-ended of all the Constitutional 
amendments); Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 38, at 87–90. 
 42 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511–12 (1997). 
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to the Smith case, because in that case, Native Americans were denied 
the right to ingest controlled substances in a ceremony of worship.43 
The argument for the Government in Boerne and Smith is that the 
historic preservation and drug laws in question did not on their face 
prohibit freedom of worship.  Thus, they do not violate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause for the reasons Justice Scalia explained in Smith.44  Our 
difficulty with this, however, is that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause protects rights absolutely from “abridgment,” whether the ab-
ridgement comes in the form of a facially neutral law or not.  The 
Constitution protects religious “exercise” or, at a minimum, “wor-
ship.”  The question for a formalist judge like Scalia is thus simply:  
whether a law “abridges”—not discriminates against but “abridges”—
freedom of religious worship.  “Abridges” here means “to make 
shorter” or “to lessen.”45  In the First Amendment context, laws are 
widely recognized “to abridge” freedom of speech or of the press if 
they are overbroad.46  Laws that heavily burden core religious worship 
and that are not supported by a compelling government interest 
would seem to abridge, or make shorter, rights of freedom of worship 
at least by being overbroad. 
At a minimum, one could say that the question of whether facially 
neutral laws with disparate impacts on worship are “abridgments” or 
not is a question that goes to the standard of proof.  We have appro-
priately recognized, in the context of racial discrimination, that Con-
gress can legislate a presumption of discrimination or of discrimina-
tory intent from disparate impacts that are unexplained by business 
necessity.47  That is all that Congress has done here with RFRA.  Con-
gress has fleshed out the concept of abridgements of the freedom to 
worship by explaining that they are present where a facially neutral 
law that is not justified by a compelling governmental interest bur-
dens an activity that is central to a religious group.48  Presumably 
Congress has, at a minimum, the remedial power to define how a 
 
 43 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874–76 (1990). 
 44 Id. at 883–91 (asserting that States are not required to accommodate otherwise illegal acts 
done in the pursuit of religious beliefs). 
 45 WEBSTER, supra note 29. 
 46 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“When the statutes also have an 
overbroad sweep . . . the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights 
may be critical.”). 
 47 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that while employment prac-
tices of discriminating against employees because of race is unlawful, it is lawful to use a 
professionally developed ability test that is not designed or intended to discriminate). 
 48 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 5 (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993). 
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Fourteenth Amendment litigant should go about proving whether or 
not there has been an abridgement. 
It is absolutely true, as the Court said in Boerne, that there is not in 
the Free Exercise area the same sordid history that Americans have 
endured with respect to race discrimination.49  Measures that might 
be “appropriate” or “proportionate” or “congruent” to eradicating 
race discrimination could thus be said to be too broad when Con-
gress is first enforcing the Free Exercise Clause of the Bill of Rights.  
The difficulty with this argument is that the Boerne Court offers no 
reason why Congress cannot legislate prophylactically against new 
evils that it anticipates may soon arise. 
There is reason for Congress to fear that the big expansion in the 
role of government we have seen in the last fifty years may undesira-
bly burden the free exercise or freedom of worship rights of individ-
ual citizens.  Congress does not need to wait until after this has hap-
pened to legislate against it.  The Court can point to no textual 
source for its conclusion that prophylactic legislation is not congru-
ent and proportional other than its own opinion about what meas-
ures are “appropriate” to enforce Section 1.  We agree with the court 
that the test here is one of congruence and proportionality, but we 
think the Court applied the test incorrectly in Boerne.  RFRA seems to 
us to have been an appropriate remedial measure to define what con-
stitutes an abridgment of the freedom to worship, given the huge 
growth we have experienced in the role of government and the im-
pact that might have in the future on the individual right of religious 
freedom. 
As we said above, the Court ought to be more deferential to Con-
gress on questions on what Section 5 laws are “appropriate” even if it 
considers de novo whether those laws “enforce” rights created by Sec-
tion 1.  Boerne is thus mostly right as to Congress’s power under Sec-
tion 5 but wrong as to Smith and RFRA.  Importantly, the Court 
reaches the wrong result in the case before it, and it wrongly declares 
unconstitutional a major act of Congress.  What about Boerne’s prog-
eny striking down federal laws forbidding the States from discriminat-
ing against the disabled or the elderly? 
 
 49 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (“In contrast to the record of wide-
spread and persisting racial discrimination which confronted Congress and the Judiciary 
in those cases, RFRA’s legislative record lacks examples of any instances of generally ap-
plicable laws passed because of religious bigotry in the past 40 years”). 
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IV. 
This leads us to our fourth point:  we do not think Congress has 
the power under Section 5 to create new suspect classes, be they clas-
sifications that burden the disabled, the elderly, or the religious.  
Note that it is vital to our argument here that we be correct that Con-
gress can protect the individual rights secured by the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, like the right to freedom of worship, because we 
do not think RFRA is justifiable on a theory that Congress can make 
discrimination on the basis of religion a forbidden classification. 
A congressional power to create new suspect classes would go well 
beyond enforcing of Section 1 and would venture into the realm of 
changing its meaning.  Congress could only validly enact such a law if 
the Court were to agree with Congress after the fact that, in its own 
independent judgment, the creation of the new suspect classification 
was a correct one.  We agree that Section 1 bans not only racial caste 
systems, but all systems of caste or of class-like discrimination.  The 
fact that the Amendment does not mention the word race, unlike the 
Fifteenth Amendment, suggests it does have a broader application.  
We think that if the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had been 
asked whether European medieval feudalism, with its class system of 
nobles and serfs, was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, 
they would have said it was not.  We likewise think that they would 
have thought the Fourteenth Amendment banned the importation of 
the Hindu caste system with its division of the people into classes of 
Brahmins and Untouchables with different civil rights.  We do agree 
that the no class-based discrimination rule of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to all systems of caste or of class-based legisla-
tion.  It is thus possible that new suspect classes beyond race could 
come to be recognized, but it does not follow that Congress ought 
simply to be able to create them on its own say so. 
The most famous extension of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban 
on class-based laws is its extension to sex discrimination.50  This exten-
sion seems to us to be easily justified notwithstanding all the angst it 
has raised over the last forty years.  Section 1 is premised on the idea 
that all citizens enjoy equal civil rights which it calls “privileges” or 
 
 50 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that parties who seek to 
defend gender-based government action demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion for that action); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (finding that Oklahoma’s gen-
der-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that unequal spousal benefits denied due process rights); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that a statutory preference for men over wom-
en violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
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“immunities.”  The Fifteenth Amendment establishes that a subset of 
citizens with equal civil rights, which is to say white and African-
American men, enjoy equal political rights like the right to vote in 
addition to equal civil rights.51  Political rights are thus established as 
being harder to get than civil rights.  After the Reconstruction 
Amendments, men, women, and children all have equal civil rights, 
but only men have political rights.  This remained the status quo for a 
half century until the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.52 
The Nineteenth Amendment, then, critically alters the legal land-
scape by giving women equal political rights to men.  Is it really plau-
sible, in the wake of the Nineteenth Amendment, to say that women 
have equal political rights to men and African Americans but that on-
ly race, and not sex, is a suspect classification for discrimination as to 
civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment?  It seems unlikely.  If 
it is forbidden “discrimination” under the Nineteenth Amendment to 
deny a woman the political right to vote because of her sex, is it not 
likely that state action that discriminates on the basis of sex as to civil 
rights violates the “no systems of caste” rule of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment?  Here it is not the Justices and not Congress that 
have recognized sex as a suspect class.  It is the American people 
themselves . . . in a constitutional amendment, no less!  The exten-
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment to ban sex discrimination is thus 
a logical consequence of the light shed back on the Fourteenth 
Amendment by the Nineteenth. 
What about other extensions of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
yond sex discrimination, such as its extension to sexual orientation 
discrimination in Romer v. Evans53 or in Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence in Lawrence v. Texas?54  As Professor Andrew Koppelman has 
pointed out, sexual orientation discrimination may just be a form of 
sex discrimination.55  Laws that forbid men who have sex with men 
from talking about it while in the military, but which do not impose 
 
 51 “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 52 “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of sex.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 53 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amendment, which precludes all 
governmental action designed to protect homosexuals, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 54 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that a law making only 
same-sex sodomy illegal was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 55 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimina-
tion, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). 
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the same ban on men who have sex with women, arguably make a 
classification on the basis of sex.  On the other hand, it is fair to point 
out that sexual orientation discrimination has not been generally un-
derstood as being sex discrimination and that gays have won no big 
political victory, like the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
that would warrant the creation of a new suspect class.  In fact, the 
matter is the subject of hot debate among the American people, and 
so arguably the courts should hold off on recognizing sexual orienta-
tion as a suspect class until the American people are at rest on the 
subject. 
What about suspect class status for the disabled or the elderly?  
Can Congress—simply by legislating—declare these two to be forbid-
den forms of caste-like discrimination?  We do not think Congress 
can, simply by passing a Section 5 statute, recognize a new suspect 
class; only the American people, by consensus over a sustained period 
of time, can do that.  That process has not yet happened with respect 
to the disabled or the elderly, although eventually it may.  We there-
fore think that the Supreme Court was right to say in its Section 5 
case law that Congress over-reached when it passed these laws.56  
These were not laws to “enforce” Section 1, but they were laws that 
changed its meaning.  This is not because Congress identified a viola-
tion of Section 1 before the Supreme Court did.  That is perfectly 
permissible.  Congress need not wait for the court to find a suspect 
class to legislate to protect it.  At the end of the day, however, the 
Court in a case or controversy has to be persuaded that Congress was 
right that something is a new suspect classification, a decision which 
is momentous and far-reaching.  We think the Rehnquist Court acted 
plausibly in saying that Congress had exceeded its powers when it 
found disability or age discrimination to be violations of Section 1 at 
least as it stands today.  Whether those decisions will stand the test of 
time remains to be seen. 
V. 
This brings us to our fifth point about Congress’s Section 5 power, 
which is:  what about laws which Congress has passed, like the Vio-
lence Against Women Act,57 which penalized private violent conduct 
against women?  The Supreme Court struck down this Act in Morrison 
 
 56 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (developmentally dis-
abled); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age). 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2006). 
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v. United States by a 5-4 vote.58  We must say that we are quite skeptical 
about Morrison for several reasons.  First, there is no doubt in our 
minds about Congress’s power to legislate to deal with sex discrimina-
tion.  We think Section 1 forbids sex discrimination as a form of caste 
to essentially the same degree as it forbids race discrimination.59  As 
we said above, that is the fair implication of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment. 
Second, we think Congress can legislate prophylactically under 
Section 5 as we argued above, and we also think there was an enor-
mous amount of evidence on the record in Morrison that violence 
against women was and is a huge problem that the States have not 
dealt with adequately. 
Third, we are not persuaded by the Supreme Court’s view in Mor-
rison that there was no State action in that case.60  The Court essen-
tially held that because Morrison, the assailant, was a private person 
who had attacked Brzonkala, a private victim, and because Virginia 
outlawed violence against women as a matter of its formal criminal 
and tort law,61 therefore there was no way in which the State of Vir-
ginia was violating the no discrimination command of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.62  We think the Court just goofed here, because it does 
not understand how the language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment works. 
We think Section 1 bans discrimination in the making of laws 
when it says, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ab-
ridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”63  
This Clause does protect individual rights against abridgment, as Mi-
chael Kent Curtis has argued,64 but it also protects against class-based 
systems of law.  The word “abridge” is used in the Fifteenth Amend-
ment in an anti-discrimination sense and in the First Amendment in 
the sense of burdens on individual rights.  Both systems of caste and 
 
 58 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 59 There may, for example, be forms of sex discrimination, like sex segregated bathrooms, 
that are unobjectionable but would be objectionable if they were segregated on the basis 
of race.  Undoubtedly, there are other examples like this but not many.  We think Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion in the VMI case is essentially right.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that VMI’s categorical exclusion of women violates the Equal 
Protection Clause but discussing unobjectionable forms of segregation). 
 60 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619–27. 
 61 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (2004) (rape); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3 (2004) (ag-
gravated sexual battery); Parsons v. Parker, 170 S.E. 1 (1933) (holding that Virginia law 
recognizes the civil action for rape). 
 62 See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. 
 63 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 64 Curtis, supra note 12. 
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laws depriving individuals of rights are fairly described in the ban on 
“abridgments” of privileges or immunities. 
If the Privileges or Immunities Clause bans discrimination in the 
making of laws, what then does the Equal Protection Clause do?  
Here, as in part with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, we follow 
Professor John Harrison’s view.65  The Equal Protection Clause is a 
clause that is about “the Protection” of the laws and not the making 
of them.  It says in essence that the States must neither discriminate 
on the basis of a suspect classification, nor discriminate in “the Pro-
tection” of the laws by enforcing facially adequate and neutral laws in 
a discriminatory way.  It is inadequate to have laws that ban violence 
against African Americans or women on the books if those laws go 
unenforced.  It is quite clear, as Michael Kent Curtis points out in his 
essay for this symposium, that the framers of the Equal Protection 
Clause saw it as protecting African Americans and white Republicans 
from private violence like lynchings and assaults that were going un-
punished by the Southern States even though the law on the books 
forbade them.66  Congress could and did create supplementary fed-
eral remedies to deal with situations like that.67 
This is precisely what Congress did in passing the Violence Against 
Women Act.  Congress was concerned about a well-documented 
problem of women being denied “the Protection” of laws against vio-
lence.68  It responded by creating a supplementary federal remedy for 
the private victims of that violence.  It is true that the state action 
here was inaction in enforcing laws against violence for the benefit of 
women, but the States are under an affirmative obligation to provide 
women and African Americans with the equal “protection” of the 
laws.  The American Constitution is, for the most part, a charter of 
negative liberties, but it is not exclusively so.  The Equal Protection 
Clause does impose some enforceable affirmative obligations on the 
States.  Ironically, the Rehnquist Court missed this point, because its 
members were so used to thinking wrongly that the Equal Protection 
Clause was the main equality guarantee in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, when in fact the Privileges or Immunities Clause plays that 
role, that they missed that the noun in the Equal Protection Clause is 
 
 65 John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L. J. 1385 (1992) 
(arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is an equality-based protection, as op-
posed to a substantive protection). 
 66 Curtis, supra note 12. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385–86 (1994) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 39–
55 (1993); S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 33–35, 41, 43–47 (1991). 
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“protection” while “equal” is only the adjective.  The Equal Protection 
Clause is about the affirmative obligation of the States to provide the 
“protection” of the laws already on the books.  Morrison v. United States 
is thus wrongly decided on the Fourteenth Amendment question. 
How far does the States’ affirmative obligation go to provide “pro-
tection” of the laws?  That is a huge subject, which we will not even 
attempt addressing here.  It suffices to say that the Clause imposes 
some affirmative obligations on the States and that state inaction in 
living up to those affirmative obligations is state action in violation of 
Section 1.  Congress can and should legislate as to such state inaction 
under Section 5. 
VI. 
Our sixth and final point raises tentative questions about Michael 
Kent Curtis’s provocative paper for this panel insofar as it contends 
that Congress can legislate directly on private citizens in its enforce-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment.69  The strongest argument in 
our view that Curtis is right is the Citizenship Clause with which Sec-
tion 1 begins.70  As Justice Harlan argued in the Civil Rights Cases,71 
Section 1 in conferring citizenship on all who are born and natural-
ized in the United States overturned the Dred Scott case.72  It made Af-
rican Americans citizens of the United States and gave them equal 
civil rights, which are citizens’ rights, with white citizens.  The words 
“civil” and “citizen” come from the same Latin root and mean the 
same thing.73  Dred Scott had explicitly said that a reason why the Court 
could not imagine that African Americans were citizens was because if 
they were, they would enjoy the civil right or citizens’ right to keep 
and bear arms!74  Since the Court could not imagine that to have 
been the case, it reached the absurd conclusion that African-
Americans were not citizens.75  The Citizenship Clause overrules all of 
this; it contains no state action requirement, and it is of course en-
forceable under Section 5.  All of this supports Michael Kent Curtis’s 
views. 
 
 69 Curtis, supra note 12. 
 70 “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction the-
reof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
 71 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27–62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 72 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 73 BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY, supra note 33, at 174. 
 74 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450. 
 75 Id. 
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The strongest argument against Curtis is that civil rights or citi-
zens’ rights are at least as much a synonym with privileges or immuni-
ties as they are derivative of citizenship.  Privileges or immunities, or 
civil rights, are very explicitly only protected from hostile state action 
and not from private action.  The use of the “No State shall” lan-
guage, with its echoes in Barron v. Baltimore76 and in the choice of 
words in Article I, Section 10, seems very deliberate and calculated,77 
as “No State shall” is a clear term of art.  Thus, the second sentence of 
Section 1 fills in any ambiguity about the scope of civil rights of citi-
zens raised by the first sentence by making it clear that privileges or 
immunities are only protected from State abridgement and not ab-
ridgement by private parties.  The specific language of the second 
sentence controls the vague, general language of the first.  It is for 
reasons of this kind that the Supreme Court early on found a state ac-
tion requirement of some kind to be implicit in Section 1.  It is true, 
as Curtis points out, that the Court in Prigg v. Pennsylvania deduced a 
congressional power to reach private conduct from the Fugitive Slave 
Clause,78 but that Clause did not use the “Simon-Says” magic words 
“no State shall.”79  Those words specifically qualify the privileges or 
immunities protected by Section 1 and make clear that they are pro-
tected only from state action and not from private action. 
We find this to be a genuinely hard question as a matter of figur-
ing out the original understanding—harder in fact than all the very 
hard questions raised by the Fourteenth Amendment that we have 
discussed so far.  Happily, it is a question that practice has settled for 
us.  We do have a state action doctrine,80 and the Court ought not and 
will not reconsider it anytime soon.  If Congress were to legislate 
against private action in a context not involving the State’s affirmative 
obligation to provide the equal “protection” of the laws, then the 
Court ought to consider Curtis’s evidence on the original under-
standing of the text along with subsequent precedent.  When Con-
gress legislates based on its understanding of the Constitution, the 
 
 76 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (discussing the Fifth Amendment). 
 77 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163–65 
(1998). 
 78 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 79 “No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into 
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from 
such Service or Labour, But shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such 
Service or Labour may be due.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIII. 
 80 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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Court cannot simply rest on its precedents, like Employment Division v. 
Smith, as a complete response. 
Congressional initiation of a dialogue with the Supreme Court81 
about a question of constitutional meaning imposes on the Court an 
obligation to do more than just fall back on its precedents.  The deci-
sion to follow stare decisis is, at bottom, a prudential one in which the 
Court concludes that the costs of abandoning a precedent, around 
which expectations have formed, exceed the benefits to be gained.82  
This judgment is quintessentially political, and it involves a weighing 
of incommensurable harms and benefits.83  Such political questions, 
as Judge McConnell notes in his critique of Boerne, are best weighed 
in Congress.84  If the democratically elected Congress or President 
disagrees with the Supreme Court’s stare decisis cost-benefit analysis 
on an issue, the Court ought to drop precedent and answer the ques-
tion based on its own view of the original meaning of the words in the 
constitutional text.  Congress cannot, in our view, force the Court to 
defer to its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment unless it is 
clearly mistaken, but it can reset the clock and force the Court to re-
visit the original meaning of a clause unencumbered by judicial case 
law.  The Court’s failure to do so in Boerne is that decision’s greatest 
weakness. 
 
 81 On the subject of dialogues between the courts and legislatures, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
 82 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution:  Text, Precedent, and Burke, 
57 ALA. L. REV. 635 (2006); Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution:  Some 
Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311 (2005). 
 83 Id. 
 84 McConnell, supra note 5, at 156. 
